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Fully thirty-five to forty percent of eligible Americans are not registered
to vote, and are therefore unable to cast a ballot on election day.' This
Note presents a framework for challenging the pre-election day registra-
tion requirement as violative of the fundamental right to cast a ballot on
election day2 in general purpose elections.3
Currently, one state does not require registration,4 and three states al-
low registration on election day.5 Critically, in the remaining states, regis-
tration may close up to fifty days prior to the election,6 preventing voting
by eligible persons who realize their interest in a particular election only
during the increasing exchange of ideas that accompanies the approach of
an election. In addition to the closing date obstacle, many of these states'
statutes either mandate restrictive registration practices or allow local reg-
istrars wide latitude concerning whether to deputize volunteers, establish
satellite sites, hold special registration drives, or extend hours.7 As a result
1. Stone, Voter Registration: Context and Results, 17 URB. LAW. 519, 520 (1985).
2. Two members of Congress are currently drafting bills that would mandate election day regis-
tration in federal elections, to be introduced to the 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Telephone inter-
views with Candy Nelson, Congressional Fellow to Sen. Alan Cranston (May 28, 1987) and Julian
Epstein, Legislative Director to Rep. John Conyers (June 1, 1987). National legislation would re-
move the need for case by case review of state registration practices in court. This Note maintains,
however, that there is a constitutional right to cast a ballot on election day that can be vindicated in
court without need for legislative directive.
3. This Note applies to general elections for officials with broad governmental powers, such as
state and federal senators and representatives. In interim elections and special purpose elections, in
contrast, the Court has identified justifications for limiting the eligible electorate beyond what would
be permissible in general elections. Regarding interim elections, the Court has upheld an electoral
scheme in which only persons registered in the same political party as the official whose position is
vacated are eligible to vote. The Court acknowledged compelling state interests particular to interim
elections, such as in "ensuring the stability and continuity of the 'legislative balance' until the next
general election; protecting the 'electoral mandate' of the previous election; and reducing 'inter-parti-
san political campaigns to once every four years.'" Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S.
1, 4 (1982) (quoting Popular Democratic Party v. Barcelo, Puerto Rico (1981)). Regarding special
purpose elections, the Court has permitted a state to limit the eligible electorate to those with a
disproportionate stake in the outcome. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (election of directors of
entity with primary function to distribute water based on land ownership permissibly limited to
landowners).
4. N.D. CENT. Cotn: § 16.1-02 (1981).
5. ME-. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 122(4) (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201.16(3)
(West Supp. 1987); Wis. STAr. ANN. § 6.29 (West 1986).
6. See LFA(UE OF WOMEN VOTERS EDUA:ATION FUND, PuB. No. 522, EASY DoES IT: REGIs-
TRATION AND ABtSENTEE VOTING PROCEDURES BY STATE (1984) (chart).
7. See, e.g., AI.A. CODE § 17-4-158 (Supp. 1986) (discretionary appointment of deputy regis-
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of this discretion, registration practices of some states, such as Virginia,
vary widely from county to county.8
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia do allow all eligible
persons to register by mail.9 Moreover, some states have recently increased
voter registration outreach efforts, in certain cases spurred by legal chal-
lenges to specific restrictive registration practices.1" These actions, while
trars); FLA. STA'r. ANN. § 98.271(1), (2) (West Supp. 1984) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-120(d)
(Supp. 1986) (same); id. § 21-2-218(0 (registration only in public places, preventing door-to-door
registration); IDAHO CODE §§ 34-209(1) (1981) (discretionary appointment of deputy registrars);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 48.4 (West Supp. 1986-1987) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:591 (West
Supp. 1986) (temporary deputy registrars prohibited); id. § 18:133 (West 1979) (discretionary satel-
lite sites); id. § 18:134A-C (discretionary hours); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 102 (West
Supp. 1986) (discretionary appointment of deputy registrars); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. Art. 33 §
3-10(a) (1986) (same); id. § 3-2(a), (c) (discretionary sites and hours); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, §§
22, 22A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978) (discretonary appointment of deputy registrars); MiCH. CoNP.
LAWS ANN. § 168.498 (West 1967) (discretionary sites and hours); Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-5-29
(Supp. 1986) (discretionary satellite sites); id. § 21-11-1, -3 (dual registration required in some mu-
nicipalities) ; Mo. ANN. S'rAT. § 115.143(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (discretionary appointment of
deputy registrars); id. § 115.143(5) (discretionary satellite sites); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-208 (1984)
(discretionary appointment of deputy registrars); id. § 32-216(3), (4) & 32-216.01 (limited sites and
discretionary hours); NEV. REV. STATr. § 293.505(2) (1986) (discretionary appointment of deputy
registrars); N.J. S'rAT. ANN. § 19:31-2 (West Supp. 1986) (same); OR. REV. STAT. 246.250(1)
(1985) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 951-5 (Purdon 1963) (same); id. § 951-16(a) (discretionary
hours); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (discretionary appointment of deputy
registrars); id. § 7-5-140 (discretionary hours); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-12-201 (1985) (volunteers
not eligible as deputy registrars); id. § 2-2-111 (discretionary satellite sites); VA. CODE ANN. §
24.1-45.2 (Supp. 1986) (discretionary registration in state agencies); id. § 24.1-46 (registrar prohib-
ited from actively soliciting registrants); id. § 24.1-49 (1985) (discretionary hours).
8. See J. Goldberg & R. Taylor, Voter Registration Practices in Virginia-the Crazy Quilt (July
1984) (unpublished ACLU Public Policy Report) (photo. reprint on file with author); R. Slattery,
Virginia's Voter Registration Laws: A Comparative Analysis (Nov. 1983) (unpublished manuscript)
(photo. reprint on file with author).
9. AI.ASKA STAr. § 15.07.050 (1976); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 303 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 15, § 2012 (1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1311(c) (1984); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-16 (1976);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 48.3 (West 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2309 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
116.045 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 3-1(c) (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 201.061 (West Supp. 1987); MONr. CODF ANN. § 13-2-203 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-221
(R.S. Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19.31-6.3 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-210(1)
(McKinney 1978); OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.11 (Anderson 1972); OR. REV. STAT. § 247.012
(1983); PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 623-19.1(a), 951-17.1(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2-2-115 (1985); TEx. Ei.FC. CODE ANN. § 13.002 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §
20-2-7 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 3-2-41 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.30(4) (West 1986).
10. In one line of cases plaintiffs successfully asserted the right of free speech in a public forum,
enabling already deputized registrars to enter welfare and unemployment offices for the purpose of
signing up registrants. See, e.g., Project Vote v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 578 F. Supp. 7
(S.D. Ohio 1982). Another line of cases found plaintiffs to have a valid freedom of association claim
when a registrar appointed deputies only from certain organizations but not from the plaintiff's or-
ganization. See, e.g., Project Vote v. Distefano, No. 84-03228 (1st Cir. June 27, 1984) (temporary
restraining order). In such cases courts have ordered registrars to establish an objective, non-partisan
basis for selecting deputies. Other cases resulted in settlements in which states agreed to take steps to
facilitate registration or to conduct a study of outreach alternatives. The state of Michgan agreed to a
settlement in August 1985 prohibiting discrimination in the appointment of deputy registrars. Louisi-
ana agreed in a settlement in 1986 to conduct a study of outreach methods in districts with the
greatest disparity between black and white registration rates. A settlement was reached in Georgia in
1986 under which each county was to submit plans for registration efforts. See The Human Serve
Campaign, Litigating the Right To Register and To Cast a Ballot: A Summary of Current Cases and
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encouraging, have failed to resolve the two key questions addressed in this
Note: First, under what circumstances is any pre-election day registration
requirement constitutionally permissible; and second, when pre-election
day registration is allowable, is the state obliged to minimize the burden
the registration obstacle imposes on the individual?
This Note argues that registration is a per se restriction of the right to
vote. First, it demonstrates that the right to cast a ballot in general pur-
pose elections is fundamental. Second, it argues that the imposition of any
registration prerequisite constitutes "any restriction" on this fundamental
right. Third, applying strict scrutiny analysis, the Note examines possible
state interests that might justify a voter' registration requirement. Upon
finding fraud prevention to be the only possible state interest reaching
"compelling" stature, it examines the extent to which states actually use
registration as a means to prevent fraud. The Note then proposes a
method for applying least restrictive means analysis in the registration
context.
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT To VOTE IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
The "fundamental rights" tier of the equal protection clause calls for
application of strict scrutiny when a restriction is placed on the exercise of
a fundamental right.11 The restriction, regardless of the basis of the classi-
fication, will be upheld only when it is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering a compelling state interest.12
Approaches (Oct. 1986) (photo. reprint on file with author). For further discussion of facilitative state
practices, see infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
11. Strict scrutiny is also applied to discrimination on the basis of "suspect classifications" such as
race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964),
national ancestry, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and alienage, see, e.g.,
Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). With suspect classifications, in contrast to
fundamental rights, it is the nature of the classification, not the nature of the activity, that triggers
strict scrutiny. To bring suit claiming discrimination against a suspect class when the legislation is
facially neutral, plaintiff must establish that the purpose of the legislation was at least partially moti-
vated by an illicit classification, such as race. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
When suspect classifications and fundamental rights are not involved, traditional equal protection
analysis requires that a state show merely a rational relationship between the classification and a
legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 111 (1979) (mandatory retire-
ment); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (decent shelter). For a study of the history and current
status of the rational basis test, see Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial
Revolution and Democratic Theory, 67 CA.IF. L. REv. 1049 (1979).
12. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (least restrictive means of further-
ing compelling state interest required when freedom of association infringed); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (durational residency requirement as prerequisite to voter eligibility not neces-
sary to promote compelling state interest); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1968) ("[Any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel], unless shown to be neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."); see also Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655 n.15 (1966) (narrowly tailored means required when fundamental rights
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A. The Fundamental Right to Cast a Ballot on Election Day
Courts should deem the individual's right"3 to cast a ballot free from
pre-election day encumbrances to be fundamental. Voting clearly consti-
tutes some form of a fundamental right14 that states must respect despite
their power under the Constitution to set voter qualifications and election
regulations.15 The ambiguity is whether the individual's "right to vote" is
and liberties threatened); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (unconstitutionally over- and
under-inclusive to disenfranchise military as means of insuring that only residents vote); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (requiring narrowly tailored means).
13. This Note discusses the individual's right to cast a ballot, and therefore, does not concern the
more tenuous constitutional status of group rights in the voting context. The Supreme Court has
drawn a distinction between individual and group rights to vote:
[TIhere is a fundamental distinction between state action that inhibits an individual's right to
vote and state action that affects the political strength of various groups that compete for lead-
ership in a democratically governed community. That distinction divides so-called vote dilution
practices into two different categories "governed by entirely different constitutional
considerations."
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Wright v. Rocke-
feller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948) ("The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms,
guaranteed to the individual.") (emphasis added). Individual and group rights in the voting context
could be viewed as intertwined. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PH5L. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 148-56 (1976) (suggesting broader interpretation of constitutional rights). Since the theory
developed in this Note rests on the individual's fundamental right, it need not reach the question of
the validity of the individual/groups rights distinction.
A claim of disparate registration rates between minority and white groups could conceivably be
brought under section two of the Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)); see Note, Eradicating Racial Discrimination in Voter
Registration: Rights and Remedies under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 52 FORDHAM
L. RF:v. 93 (1983). See generally Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. RF;v. 715 (1983).
14. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (Voting is "a fundamental political right,
because [it is] preservative of all rights.").
15. States are granted the power under the Constitution to establish voter qualifications. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. States are also authorized to set "[tihe Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives." U.S. CON-r. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see id. amend. XVII.
States could conceivably choose to fill certain public offices by election or appointment. See Rodriguez
v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 11 (1982). However, this does not diminish the applicabil-
ity of strict scrutiny once the franchise is granted. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621, 628-29 (1969). After granting the franchise, states may not exercise their right to set quali-
fications and regulations in a manner that conflicts with other provisions of the Constitution, includ-
ing the strict scrutiny accorded fundamental rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has stated:
Obviously we must reject the notion that Art. II, § 1, gives the States power to impose burdens
on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other consitutional provi-
sions. We therefore hold that no State can pass a law regulating elections that violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's command that "No State shall ... deny to any person ... the
equal protection of the laws."
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968); see also Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457
U.S. 1, 10 (1982) ("[A] citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an
equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.'" (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336
(1972))); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818 (1969) ("All procedures used by a State as an integral
part of the election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridgement
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substantive, providing an entitlement to all qualified voters to be free from
obstacles to casting a ballot, or merely a right of equal access. The conclu-
sion that the right should be deemed substantive is the logical convergence
of three strands of American jurisprudence: first, the substantive manner
in which fundamental rights have been interpreted in the equal protection
clause; second, the applicability of heightened judicial scrutiny to legisla-
tion concerning "process defects;" and third, the special treatment in prac-
tice accorded individual voting rights under the Constitution, especially
since Reynolds v. Sims."6
1. The Fundamental Rights Doctrine
The notion that there are rights implicit in the equal protection clause
of the Constitution only emerged in 1942 with Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson.1 7 Since then the Supreme Court has declared a number
of rights to be fundamental under the equal protection clause,"8 and the
list of rights courts consider fundamental is constantly evolving.19
Fundamental rights analysis looks to the nature of the activity, not the
basis of the classification."0 Strict scrutiny is triggered by an infringement
on a substantive entitlement, implicit or explicit in the Constitution.2" The
of the right to vote.").
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1131 (1969). Any pre-Skinner framing of the right to vote as merely one of equal access, e.g.,
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536-37 (1927); United States v. Cruishank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1875),
does not take into account current notions of fundamental rights.
18. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (right to travel); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963) (rights of expression and association); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 523 (1960) (freedom of association); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (criminal appeal
rights).
19. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (There is no "fixed cata-
logue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.").
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[A] statutory clas-
sification is subject to the 'compelling interest' test if the result of the classification may be to affect a
'fundamental right,' regardless of the basis of the classification."); United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d
128, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he focus, for purposes of determining whether a 'fundamental inter-
est' is involved, is not upon the punishment or other imposition to which the complaining party has
been subjected, but rather upon the activity [at issue] ...."); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1077 (1979); Developments in the Law:
Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 1180 n.78, 1181 n.82 (fundamental rights strand of equal protec-
tion analysis applicable regardless of how "equally" activity is invaded).
21. The Supreme Court has suggested that the right to vote is grounded in various provisions of
the Constitution. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1963) (right to vote in federal elections
grounded in Art. I, § 2 of Constitution); accord Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n.* (1973)
(Ninth and Seventeeth Amendments); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1973) (First Amendment);
Harper, 383 U.S. at 664 (same). Still, an explicit constitutional reference is not necessary in order to
apply substantive fundamental rights analysis. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1968) ("We
have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional
provision."). Similarly, in Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, the Supreme Court accorded the right to procre-
ate fundamental right status under the equal protection clause although it had previously, in Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927), refused to recognize an explicit constitutional guarantee of that right.
1619
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 1615, 1987
structure of fundamental rights equal protection analysis does require that
a "classification" impose a restriction on the fundamental right. The re-
gistration requirement produces such a classification; the class of persons
harmed by the registration requirement consists of those who on election
day would like to cast a ballot and are otherwise eligible but are blocked
from doing so for not having registered.22 However, a restriction on a
fundamental right need not disadvantage one definable group relative to
another.2" Moreover, the purpose of the classification is not material; it is
not necessary to demonstrate an intent to obstruct access of exactly those
who do not register.24
2. Process Defects
Courts have recognized the importance of applying heightened scrutiny
to legislation that impedes the democratic political processes necessary to
challenge the harmful legislation. In its famous footnote in Carolene
Products, the Court said: "[Liegislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unde-
sirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation. '2 5
22. The pre-election day registration requirement erects two sorts of barriers: first, by requiring
an individual to expend additional time and effort before being eligible to vote, and second, by impos-
ing an absolute barrier before persons who become aware of their preference for a specific candidate
only after the registration deadline has passed.
23. Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 1180 n.78 ("equal protection
may confer protection of substantive rights no matter how 'equally' the right is invaded"); see also
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (injury found despite inability to pinpoint exact voters
harmed); Harper, 383 U.S. at 668 (implying that poll tax burdened all voters, not just those unable to
pay).
It has been argued that the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis is not properly
an equal protection issue since it grants substantive, not just relative rights, and that matters such as
voting should instead be deemed quasi-fundamental rights, enforced independently of the equal pro-
tection clause. See Perry, supra note 20, at 1077, 1081. Although this alternative approach could be
developed, it is not necessary to step out of equal protection analysis to find a substantive right to vote
because the Supreme Court has already established the framework for substantive fundamental rights
analysis within the equal protection clause.
24. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66 (1982) (Brennan, J. concurring) (heightened
scrutiny applicable to burden on right to travel without examining legislative intent); City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 113 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (strict scrutiny applicable to fundamen-
tal rights "regardless of whether the infringement was intentional"); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRus'r 45 (1980) (motive to discriminate not relevant in fundamental rights analysis); Note, Rethink-
ing Selective Enforcement in the First Amendment Context, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 144, 156 (1984)
(same).
The intent standard enunciated in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976), was developed in and
is applicable to the suspect classification strand, not the fundamental rights strand, of equal protection
analysis. See supra note 11.
25. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (dictum); see also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsTIIUrrIONAi. LAW § 13-18 (1978) ("[Clourts should be chary of efforts by govern-
ment officials to control the very electoral system which is the primary check on their power.");
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Both courts and commentators have recognized that the high impor-
tance of voting stems from its centrality to the political process. As the
Supreme Court observed over a century ago, voting is "a fundamental
political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights."2 More recently,
in elaborating on the process defect argument, Dean John Hart Ely noted
that "unblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial re-
view ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the
quintessential stoppage. "27 Voter registration laws fall squarely within the
realm of process defects because elected officials have no incentive to be
responsive to persons who are unable to vote.2 Legislators have a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo-that is, in ensuring that those who
voted them into office will continue to be the only voters. 9
3. Voting Rights Cases
The Supreme Court has addressed the nature of the individual's right
to vote in the context of voter qualification, reapportionment, and candi-
date ballot access cases. The claim that the right to vote is just a matter of
Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and
Deconstruction, 73 GEo. L.J. 89, 103-05 (1984) (heightened scrutiny needed in instances where
democratic political processes cannot be expected to rectify harm); Developments in the Law: Equal
Protection, supra note 17, at 1129 ("Any restriction on a person's ability to participate in the political
process must be carefully scrutinized in a society where basic decisions are made and gain acceptabil-
ity through the political mechanisms of a representative democracy.").
* 26. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) ("[TIhe deference usually given to the judgment of legislators does
not extend to decisions concerning which resident citizens may participate in the election of legislators
and other public officials."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("[A]ny restrictions on that
right [to vote] strike at the heart of representative government.").
27. J. E.v, supra note 24, at 117.
28. Cf. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 & n.2
(1938) (in case involving state regulation of commerce, Court noted that "when the regulation is of
such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not
likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it
affects adversely some interests within the state").
29. Application of the Carolene Products process defects doctrine to voter registration does not
require an interventionist interpretation of the doctrine's scope. Courts are called on merely to elimi-
nate the state-imposed registration obstacle. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (courts
may prohibit, but not mandate, government action); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no
judicial relief to state inaction in contrast to state-imposed obstacle); Brest, State Action and Liberal
Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982). Moreover, the
court would just be setting in motion a procedural change, not attempting to reconstruct the outcome
that would have emerged in the legislative process absent the registration obstacle. One criticism of a
more interventionist interpretation of the Carolene Products doctrine is that any effort to reconstruct
a "fair" political process and predict the outcomes it would have favored absent the obstructive legisla-
tion would be of staggering complexity. See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV.
713, 715, 724-28, 740 (1985). Still, arguably, the process defects claim can be asserted beyond the
procedural issue present in this case, such as to protect powerless minorities from hostile substantive
legislation. See Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J.
1287 (1982). Removing the registration requirement simply frees the qualified electorate to partici-
pate on election day, enabling the democratic process to function unimpeded.
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equal access, requiring only that the classification in question not discrim-
inate among definable real life populations, interprets too narrowly the
qualification and reapportionment cases. Many of the voter qualifications/
regulations found unconstitutional in the past were indeed facially dis-
criminatory along such lines as wealth," race,3" occupation, 32 property
ownership, 33 or geography. 4 However, in these cases the Court has gen-
erally discussed both the right of equal access and a broader, more sub-
stantive, right to vote.35
The one-person, one-vote rule laid down in Reynolds v. Sims,36 a state
reapportionment case, has both absolute and relative dimensions. While
each qualified voter holds an entitlement to no more and no less than any
other voter, she also has a positive entitlement to one vote per se.37
Voter qualification cases similarly address both relative and absolute
rights. While the Court in Harper characterized the $1.50 poll tax as a
"classification" drawn along lines inconsistent with the equal protection
clause,3" it found it unnecessary to identify the particular segment of the
population harmed by the "classification."39 The focus was on the base
rights conferred on the entire potential electorate. By striking down the
tax as applied to the entire electorate, not just the class of persons unable
30. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax prerequisite to voting
violates equal protection).
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (banning white primary laws); Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down grandfather clause that exempted descendants of
people who voted prior to 1865 from literacy test voting prerequisite).
32. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (preventing resident military personnel from
voting where stationed violates equal protection).
33. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (excluding non-property
owners from school district election violates equal protection).
34. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (legislative reapportionment).
35. The few cases in which the Court has suggested that voting does not constitute a substantive
right arose either in contexts not concerning the individual's right to vote, see City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 77 (1980) (distinguishing individual's right to vote from group rights being
adjudicated); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) (dicta), or
pre-dating the emergence of the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis. See, e.g.,
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875); see supra note 17 and accompanying text
distinguishing pre-Skinner cases.
36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. "As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instru-
ments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect
legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system." Id. at 562. "To the
extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen." Id. at 567
For an interpretation of Reynolds as providing a substantive, not just a relative, right to vote, see
Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 1181-83.
38. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) ("[Once the franchise is
granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
39. Id. at 668-70 (Potential voter is burdened whether he "pays the fee or fails to pay it. ...
[C]lassifications which might invade or restrain [fundamental rights] must be closely scrutinized and




to pay, the Court suggested that all persons had a base entitlement not to
have their right to vote conditioned on payment of a poll tax.4"
In Dunn,41 which overruled a durational residency requirement, the
Court once again relied implicitly on both absolute and relative character-
izations of the right to vote. The Court asserted the applicability of
heightened scrutiny both when participation in elections "on an equal ba-
sis"' 42 is denied, and when exercise of the right to vote is "conditioned"4
or "restricted." 44 The latter characterization suggests a base entitlement of
all qualified voters.
States do have the power under the Constitution to set voter qualifica-
tions, 45 thereby defining the group of persons with this base entitlement to
vote on election day. However, "in an election of general interest, [qualifi-
cation] restrictions on the franchise other than residence, age, and citizen-
ship" are subject to heightened scrutiny.46
Candidate ballot access cases have relied on the right to vote as one
justification 47 for applying heightened scrutiny48 to ballot access restric-
tions. The right to vote relied on in candidate cases cannot be character-
ized as merely one of equal treatment since the precise voters who are
harmed by a ballot access restriction cannot be pinpointed,49 and in fact
no conceivable remedy in candidate cases has the impact of "equalizing"
voter strength. Having another candidate on the ballot does shift the bal-
40. Id.
41. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
42. Id. at 336.
43. Id. at 337 ("JAl more exacting test is required for any statute that 'place[s] a condition on the
exercise of the right to vote.'" (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (emphasis
added))).
44. Id. at 336 ("'[Blefore that right [to vote] can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and
the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny.'" (quoting
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) (emphasis added))).
45. See supra note 15. But see note 87 for position that registration is not properly classified as a
"qualification."
46. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975). The Court's wording in Hill was that such restric-
tions must promote a "compelling state interest." Finding the state's asserted interest not to be com-
pelling, id. at 301, the Court did not need to reach the question of least restrictive means. Hill relied
on Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), which did require that such
restrictions be narrowly tailored to fulfill the compelling interest. Id. at 626-27, 632.
47. The right of political expression is the other justification. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
184 (1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
48. See, e.g., Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (courts must determine extent to which state's interests
make it necessary to burden individual's voting rights); Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184
("[A) state must establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest."); Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974) (states must not adopt "unduly burden[some]" means to achieve
ends).
49. See generally Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 n.15 (equal protection analysis applicable even when
persons harmed by classification cannot be precisely identified); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144
(1972) (indeterminate number of voters burdened by candidate restriction).
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ance, increasing the potential effectiveness of votes for the new candidate
on the ballot, but it does not "equalize" effectiveness. Candidate cases thus
do not even have the equal access component.
B. Any Restriction on the Right To Vote Triggers Strict Scrutiny
Candidate ballot access cases and reapportionment cases, as discusssed
above, address the scope of the right to cast an effective ballot.50 However,
consideration of the effectiveness of the ballot would be meaningless unless
the qualified voter is able to cast a ballot unencumbered in the first place.
One must consider what level of infringement on this right is sufficient
encumbrance to trigger strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has not estab-
lished one threshold of harm at which strict scrutiny is triggered for all
fundamental rights. The "any restriction" standard applied in voting cases
is thus decisive here. This standard is consistent with the nature of voting,
an unconditional fundamental right.
1. Fundamental Rights Generally
In right to travel cases, for instance, strict scrutiny is applied when the
right is "penalized. '51 In freedom of association 52 and right to privacy 53
cases the Court has required varying degrees of burden according to the
fundamental right at issue, before applying heightened scrutiny. The Su-
preme Court has never defined the parameters of these standards, 5 nor
suggested that their applicability extends beyond the particular fundamen-
tal right in question.
A key factor distinguishing the voter registration context from a funda-
mental right protected only from "unduly burdensome interference" is the
50. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964):
Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires ...that each
citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature. Mod-
ern and viable state government needs, and the Constitution demands, no less. . . . [Tihe
achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is . . .the basic aim of legislative
apportionment ....
51. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253, 256 (1974) (denial of free non-
emergency medical care penalizes right to travel); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338, 340 (1972)
(durational residency requirement for voting penalizes right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1968) (waiting period to receive welfare benefits is penalty on right to travel).
52. E.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 560 (1958).
53. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 (1978) (freedom from unjustified interference
with marriage); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (freedom from "unduly burdensome inter-
ference" with right to abortion); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (regula-
tions regarding contraception cannot impose "burden").
54. See, e.g., Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
123-24 (1980) (court accepted without analysis plaintiff's claim that infringement of associational
rights was "substantial"); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 257-58, 260 (court
explicitly declined to define minimum amount of impact constituting "penalty").
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nature of the state interest involved. Courts have at times appeared to
anticipate the existence of state interests competing directly with the exer-
cise of a fundamental right at the stage of determining the threshold at
which strict scrutiny will be triggered. The higher threshold acts as an
implicit balancing test in cases where exercise of the individual right and
pursuit of the state interest are in direct contradiction, and thus avail
themselves of no alternative, less restrictive means by which they could be
concurrently pursued. The variant standard that results can be understood
by comparing judicial treatment of the unconditional right to travel with
the right to have an abortion free from "undue" interference.5" The right
to an abortion is "conditional" because the state's potential interest in
childbirth, under current medical technology, 6 is inextricably intertwined
with exercise of the right to an abortion. The two conflicting interests are
implicitly balanced by requiring a higher threshold of interference with
the right to an abortion than would be applicable to an "unconditional"
right, before applying heightened scrutiny. In contrast, the state cannot
have a valid interest in deterring a person from exercising the right to
travel.57 Thus, it is not an "infringement" for the state to provide eco-
nomic incentives to encourage the woman to opt for childbirth rather than
to exercise her right to an abortion, while it would be an "infringement"
for the state to provide economic incentives that distinguish between new
arrivals and long time residents in the state, discouraging travel.
Voting is more aligned with free speech and travel as an unconditional
right, requiring a lower threshold of injury before applying strict scrutiny.
The state's only potentially valid compelling interest in support of the
voter registration requirement, fraud prevention, 58 aims to prevent un-
qualified votes from being counted, not to prevent qualified voters from
voting. Every individual who meets the age, residency, citizenship and
competency requirements, and who is blocked from voting by the registra-
tion requirement, has lost a fundamental right for the sake of a collateral
matter, fraud prevention.
Finally, in determining the applicable standard, courts have drawn a
55. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (woman's right to protection from "unduly burden-
some interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy ... implies no
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and
to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds").
56. In theory, the state's interest in childbirth need not conflict directly with the woman's right to
an abortion. If medical technology reached the point where the woman could stop her pregnancy
while not interfering with the development of the fetus outside her womb, then the two interests could
be pursued concurrently. Since medical technology has not yet reached that point, the law has needed
to reconcile the conflicting interests.
57. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1968) ("Like the right of association ... [the right
to travel] is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.").
58. See infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
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distinction between removing state-imposed obstacles and undertaking
"affirmative" steps. State-imposed obstacles to fundamental rights are
subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause while the state's
failure to extend a privilege, as an "affirmative" step, need only meet the
rationality test.5" Arguably, as long as the infringement stems from state
action, the obstacle would be subject to strict scrutiny even if some persons
would be able, with effort, to surmount it.60 Since any form of pre-election
day registration is a state-imposed barrier encumbering the right to vote,
no level of "effort" a state exerts to ease the obstacle renders a registration
requirement an affirmative aid to the right to vote. States that use mail
registration, deputy registrars, satellite registration sites, and extended of-
fice hours merely make it easier to overcome the state-imposed registration
requirement. In such cases, the state has done nothing affirmatively to
induce the individual to exercise the right to vote.
2. The Voting Context
In reapportionment, voter qualification, and candidate ballot access
cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed that "any restriction" on the right
to vote triggers heightened scrutiny. The Court in Reynolds first estab-
lished the "any restriction" standard. 1 This standard was reasserted in
59. For examples of cases applying the rationality test to "affirmative" legislation, see Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (financing abortions "affirmative," because right to abortion merely pro-
tects from "undue interference"); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39
(1973) (efforts to extend education "affirmative" because education not fundamental right); McDon-
aid v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (allowing only certain sectors of
electorate to use absentee ballots "affirmative" because no constitutional right to absentee ballot).
"Affirmative" legislation is often justified by the state's interest in taking legislative reform "one
step at a time." See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466-68 (1981) ("affirma-
tive" legislation may be taken "one step at a time" for budgetary reasons); McDonald, 394 U.S. at
809 ("affirmative" action may proceed one step at a time according to which issue is "most acute to
the legislative mind"). Since fiscal constraints are not a compelling interest, see infra note 110 and
accompanying text, this rationale has not been applied and cannot be justified under strict scrutiny,
when fundamental rights or "suspect classifications" are infringed. See Note, Reforming the One Step
at a Time Justification in Equal Protection Cases, 90 YALE L.J. 1777 (1981).
60. The fact that by individual volition an obstacle can be surpassed does not necessarily lower the
applicable standard and appropriate remedy. The Court has subjected state-imposed obstacles to strict
scrutiny and imposed broad remedies even when persons affected were unwilling, though not necessa-
rily unable, to overcome the obstacle. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 146-48 (1972) (although
Court stressed candidate's alleged inability, not simply unwillingness to pay filing fee, remedy was to
eliminate filing fee system for everyone); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668
(1966) (Court abolished poll tax for all, not just for those unable to pay it). But see Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709, 714-19 (1974) (court drew unwilling/unable distinction at remedy stage, providing less
restrictive alternative only for candidates unable to pay filing fee); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752, 761-62 (1973) (rationality standard applied; petitioners admitted not changing parties earlier
due to own inaction, not state action); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S.
802, 808 (1969) (rationality standard applied; no indication in record that appellant sought means of
voting other than by absentee ballot).
61. "[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (emphasis
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Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections62 to overrule a $1.50 poll tax vot-
ing prerequisite and subsequently reaffirmed in Bullock v. Carter,6 3 dis-
tinguishing the standard applicable in voter qualification and candidate
ballot access cases.
Congressional reapportionment cases provide the best factual context
for pinpointing the minimal level of injury sufficient to trigger strict scru-
tiny, because district sizes can be changed to conform to a virtually infinite
scale of possibilities.64 Qualification cases provide a less instructive basis
of comparison for ascertaining that threshold level of harm because of the
individualized factual circumstances in which they arise.6 5 In candidate
cases, the applicable standard is distinct because the right to vote arises
only indirectly, and within the framework of the conditional "right" of
ballot access. 6 Thus, the level of injury there required to invoke strict
scrutiny is not appropriate in the registration context. 7
added).
62. 383 U.S. at 667-68.
63. 405 U.S. at 143.
64. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
65. E.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (in dual box voting system, non-property owners
burdened because not significantly less interested in and affected by bond referendum); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirement not least restrictive means to foster
compelling state interest); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ($1.50 poll tax
sufficient burden to trigger heightened scrutiny); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (disen-
franchising military unconstitutional because not narrowly tailored to tap only bona fide residents for
voting).
66. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
67. In candidate cases, the harm measured is the degree to which voters might suffer by being
unable to cast a ballot for the excluded candidate. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786
(1983) ("Our primary concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions 'to limit the field of
candidates from which voters might choose.'" (quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143)); Illinois Elections
Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979) ("By limiting the choices available to voters,
the State impairs the voters' ability to express their political preferences."). While the right to vote is
unconditional, the "right" to ballot access is conditioned by the state's valid interest in orderly elec-
tions. That is, the state has an interest in providing access only for candidates with some modicum of
voter support and can provide a narrowly-tailored obstacle to ballot access as a means. The theory is
that while giving a candidate ballot access may benefit her supporters, the confusion engendered by a
crowded ballot may concurrently impose costs on other voters. In addition, the electoral process as a
whole may be disrupted to the extent it becomes harder to pinpoint one candidate who is the choice of
the majority. E.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974) (state interest in avoiding
undue voter confusion); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145 (state interest in limiting the number of candidates
on the ballot); see also Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (state interest in assuring candi-
date on ballot has modicum of voter support); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (state
interest in maintaining electoral system in which election winner likely to be choice of majority).
The nature of this state interest in ballot access cases suggests that the threshold of harm which the
candidate's supporters must suffer in order to trigger strict scrutiny would logically be higher than
that necessary to challenge registration, the abolition of which would impose no costs on other voters,
in order to equalize the net injury incurred in both cases. The higher threshold of harm required
before applying strict scrutiny in ballot access cases can be analogized to the higher threshold the
Court has required regarding the conditional right to an abortion. See supra notes 55-57 and accom-
panying text. In both cases the state has an interest directly contrary to exercise of the individual
"right," necessitating implicit balancing of the competing interests. Thus, while Bullock reaffirmed
the holding in Harper that "the placing of even a minimal price on the exercise of the right to vote"
was not permissible, Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142, consideration of the derivative and conditioning factors
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The standard applied in congressional reapportionment cases, that no
population variation is permissible which could "practicably" be avoided,
has required the equivalent of the "least restrictive means" of redistrict-
ing. In these cases, the Supreme Court has not tolerated even de minimis
population variations among districts unless the state can demonstrate a
legitimate objective.6" Karcher v. Daggett,6" the Supreme Court's most re-
cent congressional reapportionment case, involved a districting plan in
which the average variation from perfectly equal districts was just
0.1384%,70 less than the probable error in census figures. The Court held
that the plan violated the one-person, one-vote rule. Plaintiffs met their
burden of demonstrating that alternative districting plans with smaller
population variations were available, while defendants failed to justify the
variation as necessary to achieve a legitimate goal. 7' Thus, a very minimal
variation in population was sufficient injury to warrant requiring imple-
mentation of a less restrictive plan.
II. APPLYING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS TO REGISTRATION
Registration is a classification that distinguishes between qualified per-
sons who can and cannot cast a ballot on election day, according to
whether they surmounted an obstacle, possibly weeks before the election.
It is the state-imposed obstacle in the form of registration, not simply indi-
vidual volition, that hinders exercise of the right. The registration require-
is necessary in ballot access cases. Id. at 143 ("Not every limitation or incidental burden on the
exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review.").
68. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983) (no de minimis population variation in congres-
sional districts permissible, which could practicably be avoided, absent state justification); Kirkpatrick
v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969) (same). The Court has diverged from this strict standard in
state reapportionment challenges. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983) (ten percent
population disparity needed in state districts to establish prima facie showing of violation, requiring
justification by state); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1973) (distinguishing "absolute
equality" test used in congressional reapportionment from "substantial equality" standard applicable
to state reapportionment). The court has not justified this differential in standard explicitly on consid-
erations of constitutional federalism. See Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Repre-
sentation, 94 YAI.. L.J. 163, 167 n.22 (1984). Thus, the distinction does not necessarily require
differential treatment of registration for federal and state elections. Instead, in distinguishing the state
reapportionment cases falling under the equal protection clause and congressional reapportionment
cases falling under article I, section 2 of the Constitution, the Court has emphasized that certain state
objectives may have increased importance in the context of state districting. See Brown v. Thomson,
462 U.S. at 842 (some deviation from population equality in state districting permissible to allow
"'maintainling] the integrity of various political subdivisions' and 'provid[ing] for compact districts of
contiguous territory' ") (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964)).
69. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
70. Id. at 728.
71. Defendants failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between the one justification empha-
sized-preserving minority voting strength-and the population variance. Id. at 743. The Court did
suggest, in dicta, that other state interests, if substantiated, could justify small population deviations.
"Any number of consistently applied legislative policies might justify some variance, including, for
instance, making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior dis-
tricts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives." Id. at 740.
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ment infringes the individual's right to vote at least as much as does a
districting plan that dilutes the individual's vote a fraction of one percent.
A. Registration Constitutes "Any Restriction" on the Right To Vote
1. Logically, Pre-Election Day Registration Is Burdensome
By definition, having a pre-election day registration requirement is
more restrictive than leaving the right unencumbered. An unregistered,
would-be voter who becomes aware of her interest in a given election only
after the registration deadline has passed is blocked from exercising her
right to cast a ballot on election day. Thus, any pre-election day registra-
tion requirement logically is a restriction on the right to vote and is there-
fore subject to strict scrutiny.
The level of scrutiny should not vary according to the permissiveness of
a state's current registration practices because registration itself is a re-
striction sufficient to warrant strict scrutiny. Requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate that, in her particular fact situation, registration is a substan-
tial hurdle, before applying strict scrutiny, would be inappropriate since
this amounts to looking at the merits of the claim in order to set the stan-
dard of review. 2
The only court decision to address the question of the threshold at
which strict scrutiny is triggered in the registration context, Coalition for
Sensible and Humane Solutions v. Wamser,7 3 took this erroneous ap-
proach. The court in Coalition did not dispute that there is a substantive
right to vote.' 4 However, it found the rationality test applicable upon first
concluding that the plaintiff had sufficient opportunities to register. The
Coalition court incorrectly relied upon McDonald v. Board of Election
Commissioners75 for the principle that the "standard of rationality, not
compelling state interest, applies when voting procedures do not absolutely
preclude individuals from voting. '"7 6 Actually, the court in McDonald rec-
ognized the position taken in Harper that "because of the overriding im-
portance of voting rights, classifications 'which might invade or restrain
them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.' "7 Because the
72. The question whether sufficient registration opportunities exist is more appropriately ad-
dressed at the stage of evaluating whether the means used are the least restrictive. Depending on the
degree to which the state is actually using registration as a means to prevent fraud, some state statutes
might end up passing as the least restrictive means. See infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
73. 590 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1984), affd, 771 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 222 (presuming right to vote but requiring restriction be of some substance before
compelling state interest test triggered).
75. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
76. 590 F. Supp. at 222.
77. 394 U.S. at 807. An alternative reading of McDonald is that the court drew a distinction
between the "right to vote" and the "right to vote conveniently," finding strict scrutiny applicable to
the former but not the latter. The court in Coalition followed this interpretation of McDonald in
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plaintiffs in that case, pretrial detainees, apparently did not allege that the
state restricted their right to vote (claiming instead a right of equal access
to a particular form of voting, by absentee ballot), strict scrutiny was not
mandated. The analysis developed here is fully consistent with McDonald
in that plaintiffs would be directly challenging the restriction-registra-
tion-rather than insisting on the right to be registered in a specific
manner.
2. Statistical Studies
Statistics substantiate the conclusion that registration constitutes "any
restriction" on the right to vote. Voter participation rates in the United
States declined significantly as states began to introduce personal registra-
tion requirements, toward the end of the nineteenth century.78 Moreover,
the registration rates in the states with the least-restrictive registration
procedures are significantly higher than the national average, while turn-
concluding that an infringement of the right to vote must be of some substance before strict scrutiny is
triggered.
This Note argues that such an interpretation does not necessarily follow from the language in
McDonald. McDonald did not confront directly the right to vote. Rather, the matter before the Court
was the narrow question of whether there exists an entitlement to an absentee ballot. Justice Mar-
shall, writing for the majority in Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 300 n.9 (1975), similarly made this
interpretation of McDonald ("[T]he only issue before the Court [in McDonald] was whether pretrial
detainees in Illinois jails were unconstitutionally denied absentee ballots . . .. [Tlhere was nothing in
the record to indicate that the challenged Illinois statute had any impact on the appellants' exercise of
their right to vote."). Under this interpretation, McDonald does not contradict the notion that strict
scrutiny is applicable when the right to vote is restricted. This understanding of McDonald is also
consistent with the long line of reapportionment cases, see infra note 68 and accomapnying text,
candidate ballot access cases, see infra note 67 and accompanying text, and qualification cases, e.g.,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (all resident citizens of voting age eligible to
vote upon payment of poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (servicemen had the option of
voting by absentee ballot in their home states), that make clear that the threshold for triggering strict
scrutiny is far below absolute denial of the right to vote.
The absentee ballot issue presented in McDonald is distinct from voter registration also in that it
directly implicates the manner of holding elections, a matter left to state legislatures and Congres-
sional oversight under article I, section 4 of the Constitution. Pre-election day regulations, such as
registration, are not explicitly left to legislative determination.
78. Burnham, The Appearance and Disappearance of the American Voter, in Ei.C-IrORAI. PAR-
TICIPATION: A COMPARa'Itw ANA.YSIs 48-49, 53-55 (R. Rose ed. 1980). In most other democra-
cies, the government assumes the responsibility for initiating registration. See Stone, supra note 1, at
521. The United States remains the only Western democracy that does not have some form of compul-
sory or automatic registration. Id. at 521; D. Glass, P. Squire & R. Wolfinger, What the United
States Can Learn from Other Democracies About Voter Turnout (unpublished, unnumbered, undated
manuscript) (photo. reprint on file with author). Not surprisingly, current U.S. registration and turn-
out as a percentage of voting age population are lower than in all other democratic countries except
Switzerland. Powell, Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, Legal, and Socio-Economic
Influences, in Ei.L-rORAL PARTICIPATION: A COMPARATIv ANALYSIS, supra, at 6 (table 1); D.
Glass, P. Squire & R. Wolfinger, supra, at table 1. Notably, the turnout rate in the U.S. in the late
1800's (just prior to the introduction of personal registration) is comparable to that of the current rate
in these other countries. Burnham, supra, at 49. Significantly, current U.S. turnout as a percentage of
registered voters is also comparable to that in these other countries. D. Glass, P. Squire & R. Wolf-
inger, supra, at table 1.
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out as a percentage of registered voters in those states differs little from
the national average." One study concluded that, if all states followed the
registration practices of the most permissive states, turnout would increase
by over nine percent.8 0 These statistics suggest that registration poses a
very real barrier to the right to vote, and that if this barrier were re-
moved, more eligible persons would actually exercise their right to cast a
ballot on election day.
3. Evolving Standards of Equal Protection
The Supreme Court's interpretation of equal protection has changed
through time."1 In the voting rights context, earlier court cases and federal
legislation had to tackle voting prerequisites that posed more blatant bar-
riers to electoral participation, such as poll taxes,82 literacy tests, 3 grand-
father clauses, 4 and durational residency requirements.8 5 The time has
come for our equal protection jurisprudence to recognize that the practice
of registration, while more subtle than these other devices, nonetheless
places a very real restriction on the fundamental right to vote.
B. Possible State Interests in Registration
Once the plaintiff has established that "any restriction" on the right to
vote is present, thereby triggering strict scrutiny, the state must prove that
the registration requirement is the least restrictive means of serving a
compelling state interest.88
79. D. Glass, P. Squire & R. Wolfinger, supra note 78, at table 4. Consequently, a higher per-
centage of the voting age population in the less restrictive states actually votes.
80. Powell, supra note 78, at 11; see also Burnham, supra note 78, at 57.
81. The Supreme Court's reversal, in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), of the long-
held "separate but equal" doctrine is a prime example of the evolution of equal protection.
82, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
83. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (upholding constitutionality of Voting Rights
Act provision banning literacy test voting prerequisite); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658
(1966) (same). But see Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (pre-
Voting Rights Act case upholding constitutionality of non-discriminatory literacy test). For a discus-
sion of the limited precedential value of Lassiter, see infra note 89.
84. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
85. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
86. Courts have actually applied various constructions of heightened scrutiny to voting rights. See
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (legislative districting plan with average population varia-
tion of merely 0.1384% too restrictive under standard permitting only "necessary means of achieving a
legitimate state objective"); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
184-85 (1979) (classification must be "necessary to serve a compelling interest," and must employ
"least drastic means" to achieve that end); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974) (as applied to
indigent candidates, filing fee not least restrictive means to obtain ballot access); Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1972) (method of financing primaries that burdens candidates does not with-
stand "close scrutiny"); see also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 268 (1974)
(perjury law as example of less restrictive means than durational residency requirement to fulfill
interest in fraud prevention); Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 1983) (dictum) ("The state
may ... restrict voting ... only if the limiting classification has been precisely tailored to serve a
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A state might assert either "qualification" or "regulatory" interests in
registration. Qualification interests can be conceptualized as those which
further, in their own right, the intelligent use of the ballot, 7 while regula-
tions concern maintenance of the integrity of the electoral process.8 8
1. Registration Cannot Rationally Serve as a Voter Qualification
No state interest in registration as a voter qualification would be per-
missible since registration has no rational relation to the intelligent use of
the ballot.8" The fact that an individual registered at some point in time
bears no relation to the likelihood that she will cast an informed, rational
ballot on election day. Furthermore, the state's interest in qualification
can extend only to promotion of the intelligent use of the ballot. Registra-
tion as a means of selecting out an electorate more generally dedicated to
the political process, rather than just interested in a particular election,
would not therefore pass even the rational basis test.
Moreover, registration cannot be narrowly tailored to tap a more inter-
ested, informed electorate. Even if this were a compelling state interest,90
the registration process, by its nature, is both over- and under-inclusive.
Not only does registration block access to voting by citizens who become
informed and interested after the registration deadline, it allows for inclu-
sion of persons who simply found it more convenient to register or who
registered years ago but are uninformed about this election. The election
compelling governmental interest."). But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 682 (1973) (registra-
tion closing date fifty days prior to election, except for Presidential elections, permissible "under cur-
rent conditions").
87. Doty, The Texas Voter Registration Law and the Due Process Clause, 7 Hous. L. REV. 163,
192 (1969). Under this qualification/regulation division, the use of registration to verify that only
persons meeting the requisite age, citizenship, competency and residency requirements vote is a regu-
latory interest. In this capacity, registration does not act to qualify voters further, but rather acts as a
proxy for the qualifications that the individual possesses independently of the registration require-
ment. Consistent with this division, most state constitutions and case law do not classify registration as
a voter qualification. See Note, Federal Voter Registration: A Proposal To Increase Voter Participa-
tion, 8 CoI.uM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 225, 234-36 (1972) [hereinafter Federal Voter Registration].
88. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
89. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (poll tax not rationally
related to intelligent use of ballot). Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959) (upholding literacy test voting prerequisite), is not to the contrary because a literacy test,
unlike a registration requirement, has "some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use
of the ballot." Id. at 51. Nonetheless, the rational basis standard applied in Lassiter is of questionable
precedential value because it pre-dates the application of heightened scrutiny to individual voting
rights starting with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 770. But
see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (range of possible legitimate state interests should
not be underestimated); id. at 753, 760 n.26 (Stevens, J., concurring) (other state interests may be
more important than perfect numerical equality); id. at 779-80 (White, J., dissenting) (many possible
valid state interests); id. at 787-88 (Powell, J., dissenting) (other valid considerations exist).
90. The Supreme Court has found the objective of intelligent use of the franchise to be legitimate.
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 n.15 (1966). The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
whether in a general purpose election the specific objective of an interested electorate is compelling.
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
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outcome undoubtedly affects all citizens, and thus, until election day any
citizen has the potential of becoming interested in the issues and candi-
dates."1 Certainly the behavior of candidates and pollsters in the weeks
prior to an election suggests that they do not believe that either the citi-
zens' awareness of the issues or their preference for candidates is frozen
once the registration deadline has passed. The information flow concern-
ing issues and candidates peaks in the weeks and even days before the
election, often after the registration deadline has passed.
2. The Compelling State Interest in Preventing Voter Fraud
Historically, the most common justification given for the registration
requirement has been prevention of voter fraud.92 Plainly, fraud preven-
tion is a compelling state interest. States do have an interest in assuring
that only persons meeting the residency, age, competency and citizenship
qualifications vote, and do so only once. However, the legitimacy of a
state's assertion that registration serves to prevent voter fraud hinges on
whether the state is actually using registration for that purpose.93 Theo-
retically, pre-election day registration provides the state with time to ver-
ify that each registrant actually has a residence at the address indicated
and is claiming no more than one address as a voting base. There are two
types of verification mechanisms that could systematically make use of the
time interval between a registration cut-off date and election day. First,
states could compare both interstate and intrastate records to verify that
no individual with the same identification information has registered to
vote at more than one location. For example, dual registration by students
living away from their permanent residences, and farmers finding tempo-
rary employment in the city could be identified by comparing registration
records among different jurisdictions.94  Second, by sending non-
91. See Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970) ("when all citizens are affected in
important ways by a governmental decision[,]" "t violates equal protection to exclude otherwise quali-
fied citizens from the franchise); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422-26 (1970) (state cannot have
valid interest in restricting access to franchise by persons less affected by state activites as long as they
are somewhat affected); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 270-71 (1970) (opinion of Bren-
nan, White & Marshall, JJ.) ("particular group may not be denied the right to vote merely because
many, or even most, of its members could properly be excluded").
92. See Federal Voter Registration, supra note 87, at 237 (citing numerous state cases giving
fraud prevention as justification for voter registration); Burnham, supra note 78, at 43 (stated reason
for emergence of registration laws was fraud prevention). See generally J. HARRIS, REGISTRATION
OF VOTERS IN -Tx UNITED STATS (1920).
93. Cf Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 742 n.12 (1983) (mere assertion of a number of inter-
ests in district population disparity insufficient state justification); see also note 71 and accompanying
text.
94. Actually, what fraud does result through isolated instances of farmers and students casting
ballots in two jurisdictions may have only an inconsequential, random effect on the election outcome
anyway. The minor impact of isolated votes cast for diverse candidates contrasts with the greater
threat posed by a systematic effort to inundate a jurisdiction with fraudulent votes for a particular
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forwardable postcards to all registrants, or checking registrant data
against utility company and telephone records, authorities could identify,
prior to election day, persons registering with fraudulent addresses.
In practice, states vary in the degree to which they implement pre-
election day fraud detection methods. No state routinely checks its regis-
tration records against those of other states. 5 Only when a new registrant
admits to having previously registered elsewhere is it common for notice to
be sent to the previous jurisdiction, directing cancellation of her registra-
tion there.96 Some states do keep central computerized files enabling them
to identify individuals who provided the same name, birthdate, and social
security number for more than one address within the state.97 However,
since many states do not require identification upon registering," an indi-
vidual intent upon committing fraud could easily circumvent this intra-
state checking mechanism by supplying different names and birthdates for
different alleged addresses.
By sending out non-forwardable postcards far enough in advance of the
election such that undeliverable cards are returned to the Election Com-
mission before election day, election officials could spot registrants provid-
ing false addresses. In practice, even among those states that do send out
non-forwardable postcards,99 the status of the registrant whose postcard is
returned varies. Some states simply allow the registrant to vote as usual
despite the alert that the registrant's data may have been false.1"' In other
candidate.
95. Telephone interview with Marlene Cohn, Election Service Specialist, League of Women Vot-
ers, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 10, 1986); telephone interview with Peggy Sims, Ass't Director of Infor-
mation, Federal Election Commission (Dec. 8, 1986).
96. Telephone interview with Marlene Cohn, supra note 95. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-32 (West Supp. 1987) (mandating registrar to notify other jurisdiction only if registrant admits to
prior registration there). This mechanism does little to check fraud, however, since a new truthful
registrant who inadvertently remains on the registration list of her previous jurisdiction would be
unlikely to attempt to vote there anyway. Meanwhile, a person intent on fraud could easily circum-
vent this checking mechanism by not admitting that she is already registered in another state.
97. States that keep centralized registration lists include Alaska, Delaware, Kentucky, South Car-
olina, Virginia, and Wyoming. Arthur Young & Co., Statewide Registration Systems I, 10-11 (Dec.
1, 1977) (unpublished study) (photo. reprint on file with author).
98. Only nine states require registrants to supply positive identification. Id. at app. B. Most states
rely simply on oath and signature requirements before recording a registrant. See, e.g., Ky. REv.
STAr. ANN. § 116.065 (Supp. 1986).
99. Approximately nineteen states make use, in some manner, of a non-forwardable postcard sys-
tem to verify registrant information. Arthur Young & Co., supra note 97, at app. B.
100. In Mississippi, for example, the elections statute makes no mention of non-forwardable post-
cards. See Miss. COD- ANN. §§ 23-5-32 to 23-5-313 (Supp. 1986). Election notification cards are
sent out, but not in a non-forwardable manner. Telephone interview with Nancy Sulser, Special
Projects Officer, Public Lands and Elections Divison of the Office of the Mississippi Secretary of
State (Dec. 4, 1986). Fraudulent registrants, therefore, will not be caught through the postcards sent
out. The Kentucky election statute only mentions purging registrants based on the county board's own
knowledge. Ky. Rtv. S'rAT. ANN. § 116.125 (Supp. 1986). Although voter identification cards are
sent out to registrants, there is no provision for investigating the validity of registrants with non-
deliverable cards. Telephone interview with Margie Wade, Data Processing Supervisor, Kentucky
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states, the registrant whose non-forwardable card was returned must on
election day sign an affidavit or take an oath swearing that she really does
reside at the challenged address. Only upon completion of this additional
procedure may the questioned individual cast a ballot."' Finally, some
states, in addition to administering an oath or affidavit, will isolate the
challenged ballot, leaving its validity to be resolved by investigation fol-
lowing the election.102 Only this last group of states is in fact effectively
using pre-election day registration as a means of flagging registrants with
possibly fraudulent addresses before the election.
The fact that many states do not use registration as a verification tool to
the degree theoretically possible supports the thesis that these states do not
perceive fraud through registration to be a major problem. Systematic
election fraud is more likely to be conducted by election officials than by
private individuals, 03 and at the voting rather than registration stage.104
Registration restrictions thus are ineffective means of combatting the more
prevalent forms of voter fraud.
C. "Least Restrictive Means" Analysis
1. Judicial Authority
Courts have the authority to make a judgment concerning least-
restrictive means in the registration context.1 05 In school desegregation,0 6
mental hospital,10 7 and prison01  cases, courts have directed states to com-
State Board of Elections (Dec. 3, 1986).
101. In New York, for example, a registrant whose postcard is returned must take an affirmative
oath before casting a ballot. Telephone interview with Marsha Watson, Office Manager, New York
Board of Elections (Dec. 5, 1986). In Illinois an individual whose voter identification card is returned,
or whose right to vote is challenged on election day, must show additional identification and complete
an affidavit. Depending on the jurisdiction, this procedure takes place either at the polling place or at
the county courthouse before the ballot is accepted. Telephone interview with Yvonne Smith, Assistant
to Executive Director, Illinois State Board of Elections (Dec. 5, 1986).
102. In California, for example, a voter whose notification card is returned can vote by provi-
sional ballot. The ballot is then isolated, to be counted only after the county clerk has verified the
voter's information.
103. See Hearings on S. 1199, S. 2445, S. 2457 & S. 2574 Before the Senate Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1971) (testimony of Sen. Kennedy); Federal Voter
Registration, supra note 87, at 231.
104. Id. at 196 (statement of Sen. McGee); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14253 (West Supp. 1987). One
study found that only three percent of 6233 election boards surveyed reported claims of fraud through
registration over the period 1963 to 1974. Voter Registration By Mail: Hearing on S. 1177 Before the
Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1975) (ABA Special
Committee on Election Reform, Report to the House of Delegates (1974)); id. at 639, 646 (statement
of Young Lawyers Section, Bar Ass'n of Dist. of Columbia (citing Office of Federal Elections, Survey
of Election Boards-Final Report 22-23)).
105. See supra notes 12, 86.
106. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
107. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). These
two cases were consolidated on the appellate level, affd in material respects sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
108. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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ply with broad, detailed remedial plans. In reapportionment cases, courts
have invalidated legislative districts with population disparities. 0 9 Simi-
larly, a structural change may be needed with respect to voter registration
in order to vindicate the individual rights implicated.
The Supreme Court has never ruled that limiting state expenditures
could be a compelling interest to which a remedial order must conform. 10
The decrees issued in the desegregation, mental hospital, and prison cases
often had the effect of requiring states to reallocate funds and make large
additional expenditures."' Such decrees have never been reversed on ap-
peal specifically on the ground that compliance required undue state ex-
penditure. Moreover, in the voting context, courts have required remedies
that could only be implemented by increasing state expenditures. 12 Thus,
courts can clearly issue decrees defining least restrictive means in the re-
gistration context, with the expectation that states will undertake the req-
uisite effort and expense needed for compliance.
2. Least Restrictive Means in the Registration Context
The key question in least restrictive means analysis is whether there
exist alternative procedures that could be followed on election day to ac-
complish the fraud prevention purpose for which a state is actually using
pre-election day registration. If such procedures exist, a state could serve
its compelling interest while removing the registration closing date burden
109. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (25% to 35% of
current House district lines drawn by courts).
110. The Supreme Court has in fact drawn a distinction between the relevance of fiscal con-
straints under the rationality standard and the inapplicability of such concerns under strict scrutiny.
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972), for example, acknowledged that budgetary concerns may
be a legitimate state interest, but do not constitute "an element of necessity" to be taken into consider-
ation when structuring a remedy of an infringement on the fundamental right to vote; see also Car-
rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1965) (unconstitutional to disenfranchise military because less
restrictive, albeit more costly, method available to tap precisely those eligible to vote); Bishop v.
Lomenzo, 350 F. Supp. 576, 587 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (registration closing date case holding that solution
lies in providing more registrars, not in registering fewer people, a remedy requiring state
expenditure).
111. See, e.g., Milliken, 433 U.S. at 289 ("federal courts [are permitted] to enjoin state officials to
conform their conduct to requirements of federal laws, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact
on the state treasury"); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) (equity
assures that "all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effective remedy"); Davis v. Board
of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (court's powers may be applied broadly
"to achieve the greatest possible degree of [relief], taking into account the practicalities of the situa-
tion"); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("Once a right and a
violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies."); Wyatt v Aderholt, 503 F.2d at
1318 (if state legislature fails to allocate funds, court may take affirmative steps to ensure proper
funding); see also Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. R v. 1, 46-50 (1979) (approving of broad remedial action by courts).
112. See cases cited supra note 110.
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on the individual voter. Election day registration would still permit states
to undertake more verification measures than many currently do. Verifica-
tion measures that could easily accompany election day registration in-
clude the following: First, the requirements to take an oath and sign one's
signature carry both a psychological deterrent against falsity 13 and a legal
deterrent in the form of penalties for perjury. Election day registration
does remove the opportunity for election officials to compare signatures
signed at two different times. It is still possible, though, to derive the psy-
chological gain from requiring two sequential oaths, one upon registering
and the second upon actually voting. Second, all election day registrants
could be required to provide positive identification, such as a driver's li-
cense or utility bills, indicating the address the voter is claiming. Regis-
trants who provide identification lacking an address or indicating an out
of district address could be put immediately into a "challenged" category,
to be included in the ballot count only upon subsequent verification of
residency. Third, existing registered voters in the precinct could vouch for
new registrants. Fourth, the currently common practice of requiring a
voter to cast a ballot at only one designated polling site eliminates the
possibility that an individual could use the same residence identification to
vote at different polling sites. Thus, the procedural requirement that, re-
gardless of where one registers, one must report to a designated polling
place in order actually to vote serves as a concurrent check across jursidic-
tions for multiple voters. Fifth, registrants could be advised upon register-
ing that stiff penalties for providing fraudulent information will be en-
forced. Sixth, the role of both partisan and nonpartisan poll watchers
could be enhanced; these poll watchers could challenge voters who they in
good faith believe are providing fraudulent information.' 14 Sealed, marked
ballots of challenged voters could be put in a separate box to be counted in
the election results only once the identification provided is verified. The
above procedures indicate that many alternative truth-inducing devices re-
lied on in the registration process can be employed equally as well on
election day.
In practice, states can be broken down into three categories regarding
the feasibility of converting to an election day registration mechanism ca-
pable of countering fraud to the same degree as their current, pre-election
113. The psychological deterrent effect from taking an oath derives from the solemn circumstances
under which it is administered, and the length of the oath. For further discussion of the psychological
deterrent posed by a signature requirement, see Comment, A Model Voter Registration System, NAT'L
Civ. Rv., March 1984, at 104, 108.
114. Many states already permit individuals to challenge the qualifications of voters at the polls.
E.g., IDAHO Coin- § 34-431 (1981) (any elector can challenge registrant); MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN.
§ 168.512 (West Supp. 1986) (same).
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day mechanisms." 5 The first group includes states that make no use of
the time interval between the close of registration and election day for
verification."' 6 These states have not demonstrated a need for pre-election
day registration to combat voter fraud.
The second category includes states that use the verification tool of cross
checking registrant information within the state through centralized files.
This task, however, could be accomplished equally well on election day.'"
For example, several states already have computer systems that allow for
rapid cross checking of registrant information throughout the state."' By
simply expanding this type of system, information provided by election
day registrants could be immediately cross checked against the state's files
to confirm that no one with identicial identification is registered for an-
other address in the state. This system of checking would be facilitated by
requiring election day registrants to provide positive identification. Cost
could be minimized if the computer terminals were installed only in speci-
fied locations at which the individual would obtain a certificate of regis-
tration that she would then carry on to her designated polling site."1 9
115. Of course, states could move among these categories. For example, a state that began using
non-forwardable postcards for fraud detection would move to category three, while a state that
stopped using registration for any pre-election day fraud prevention purpose would move to category
one.
116. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. SrATr. ANN. §§ 9-32, 33 (West Supp.1987) (only systematic fraud
prevention mechanism mentioned is door-to-door registration data verification, a method that could be
extended to affirmative voter registration); telephone interviews with Althea Tyson, Democratic Dep-
uty Registrar, State of Connecticut and Judy Kozak, Director, League of Women Voters, State of
Connecticut (Dec. 5, 1986); IDAHO CoDE §§ 34-401 to 34-438 (1981 & Supp. 1986) (no provision
for verifying registrant data prior to election day); telephone interview with Penny Ysrura, Adminis-
trative Secretary, Elections Division, Idaho Department of State (April 22, 1987); VA. Coniw ANN. §
24.1-46 (12), (13) (1985) (non-forwardable postcards not used; registrar only obliged to strike from
registration list persons known to registrar to be unqualified); telephone conversation with Deborah
Boyde, Director of Computer Systems, Virgina Board of Elections, (Dec. 4, 1986); see also supra note
100.
117. Should these computer runs require more than instantaneous processing time, the registra-
tion deadline could be set just far enough in advance of the election to allow for processing time, such
as 48 hours prior to election day.
118. In Kentucky, for example, local registrars input voter registration data directly into a state-
wide computer system. Telephone interview with Jim Conner, Data Processing Manager, Kentucky
State Board of Elections (June 1, 1987). In South Carolina, approximately 15 out of 46 jurisdictions
can input directly into the state-wide computer system. Telephone interview with Jim Hendrix, Assis-
tant Director, South Carolina State Election Commission (June 1, 1987). In California, registration
infromation is centrally computerized. By statute, a county registrar may request the Secretary of
State to check the county's registration list against those of other counties, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 613
(West Supp. 1987), and in practice, all county registration lists are run against each other at least
once a year to detect duplicate registrants. Telephone interview with John Mott-Smith, Elections
Analyst, California Board of Elections (June 2, 1987). In Illinois, 101 of 111 election jurisdictions
have some election information computerized on a local level, and at least two jurisdictions, Chicago
and Cook County, run registration lists against each other to spot duplicate registrants. Telephone
interview with Yvonne Smith, supra note 101.
119. In Wisconsin, for example, persons who register on election day must first properly execute
a registration form at the municipal clerk's office before proceeding to cast a ballot at the polling
place. Wis. STATr. ANN. §§ 6.29, 6.55 (West 1986). This is a greater burden than allowing registra-
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The third set of states, those using non-forwardable postcards to iden-
tify false addresses, are using registration as a fraud detection device that
cannot be duplicated by an election day mechanism.120 These states still
must pursue that interest in the manner least restrictive of the right to
vote. The National Municipal League has proposed door-to-door canvass-
ing as a mechanism by which, at little additional expense, states could
continue to use registration for verification while minimizing the burden
on individuals posed by registration. 2 Practices currently used in states
more accommodating to registrants also suggest less restrictive means. For
example, in Pennsylvania, registration forms are made available to those
who apply for a driver's license, a library card, or admission to an institu-
tion of higher education.' 22 Rhode Island provides for annual registration
drives at each high school.' 23 California has used a toll-free telephone
number for registration.' Several states have recently established policies
by which registration forms could be distributed through public agen-
cies. 2 Utility companies could regularly include a registration form with
tion at the polling place. Still, it does eliminate the time obstacle posed by pre-election registration
closing dates.
120. Non-forwardable postcards sent out after the election as a check on election day registrants
can also serve as a deterrent, if individual prosecutions follow the discovery of fraudulent information.
Minnesota conducts such a post-election check. In Minnesota, the county auditor sends out non-
forwardable postcards to all election day registrants after the election with the threat that illegal
registrants will be investigated by the county attorney and prosecuted. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
201.121(3), 201.275 (West Supp. 1987).
121. For a detailed description of the National Municipal League's voter registration proposal,
see Comment, supra note 114. Under this mechanism, during a set time period each year, such as
during the month ending thirty days before a primary or general election, canvassers would go door-
to-door to collect names of eligible voters in the jurisdiction. Canvassers could either accept the word
under oath of persons actually at the residence during the visit, concerning other eligible voters living
at the residence, or could leave cards for the absent residents to fill out and return by mail, enabling a
signature check for all household registrants. After concluding the canvass, states would still have time
to send out non-forwardable postcards to verify the results.
Door-to-door canvassing is already a familiar concept in the United States. Approximately one-
third of the states have statutes permitting door-to-door canvassing as an alternative method of verify-
ing aleady submitted registrant data. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STA-r. ANN. § 116.045(2) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1982); MICH. Com. LAWS ANN. § 168.515 (West 1967). Some state statutes list door-to-
door canvassing as an optional method of recording new registrants. E.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-2
(West Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-2-7.1(4) (1984). In at least one state, Idaho, some
county registrars have directed door-to-door registration although the state statute does not explicitly
mention it. Telephone interview with Penny Ysursa, supra note 117. One county in Idaho has
achieved close to a 100% registration level by using door-to-door canvassing. See NATIONAl. CENTER
FOR Poi.It:Y AI:TERNA'I'IVES, VOTER REGISTRATION AND THE STATES: EFFEC(IVE POLICY AP-
PROACHES To INCREASING PARIICIIATION 71 (1986) [hereinafter VOTER RErcSrRATION].
122. PA. S'rA'r. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 623-19.1(b), 951-17.1(b)(1) (Perdon Supp. 1986). At least six
other states-Maine, Ohio, Michigan, Arizona, Oregon, and Colorado-permit registration at motor
vehicle bureaus as well. Michigan in fact has shown an estimated 15% increase in registration level
since 1970 when this reform was introduced. See HUMAN SERVE FUND, EXECUTIVE ORDERS: A
NEw STRATEGY To UsE PUB.i: A(;EN(:IFS To INCREASE VOTER REGISTRATION 4 (1985).
123. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-9-4.1 (1981); see also TEx. Et.EC. CODE ANN. § 13.046 (Vernon
1986) (registration forms distributed at high schools).
124. See VOTER REGIS-rRATItON, supra note 121.
125. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.07.025 (West 1987); Ohio Exec. Order No. 84-33
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materials sent to new customers signing up for utility service. These dis-
tribution schemes might be implemented either by deputizing some work-
ers at the participating institutions or by permitting individuals to return
the forms by mail. The cost of these mechanisms would be little more
than the time required to train some employees to answer registrants'
questions.
A state would not be relieved of its obligation to extend registration
opportunites simply by demonstrating the use of some facilitative prac-
tices. It would be for courts to determine, case by case, the threshold at
which anticipated fraud from a specific facilitative mechansim would jus-
tify the state in not implementing that particular mechanism.126 While
increasing registration opportunites does not eliminate the barrier com-
pletely, it may present the least restrictive means in states actually using
pre-election day registration for fraud prevention.
III. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of the voter registration requirement should be
challenged under the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analy-
sis. Because registration itself is a restriction on the fundamental right to
vote, strict scrutiny should be applied to any registration requirement. Of
the various interests a state might assert, only the regulatory interest in
fraud prevention could be both compelling and potentially appropriately
addressed through registration. No form of pre-election day registration is
necessary when states are not making use of registration as a means to
combat voter fraud or if an alternative election day mechanism is available
to accomplish the fraud prevention purpose for which the state is actually
using its registration data. At a minimum, strict scrutiny requires states
that are using the time interval between a registration deadline and the
election to detect voter fraud to open up channels for registration, making
it more likely that all qualified voters will be able to surmount the regis-
tration barrier.
(1984), New York Exec. Order No. 43 (1984), reprinted in HUMAN SERVE FUND, supra note 123,
at 9, 13; see also Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d, 486 N.E.2d 794, 495 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1985) (upholding
state executive order providing for voter registration in state service offices).
126. A state that could demonstrate a larger fraud problem might for example need to implement
costly safeguards, such as supervisors of volunteer registrars, as it opens up registration opportunities.
Thus, a state with a more severe demonstrated fraud problem might have higher costs related to
implementation of facilitative registration practices than states that could not justify the need for such
safeguards.
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